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Abstract
We consider an equilibrium model of social learning with heterogeneous con-
sumers and firms that act strategically. Consumers search for high qualities among
a large set of firms, and can condition their choices on observed actions of other con-
sumers. When they can recognize consumers who are more likely to have identified
a high quality firm, uninformed individuals will optimally emulate those consumers.
One group of consumers arises endogenously as “leaders” who are being emulated.
Follow-on sales induce firms to give preferential treatment to these lead consumers,
which reinforces their learning.
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“One very clear impression I had of all the Beautiful People was their prudence. It
may be that they paid for their own airline tickets but they paid for little else.”
James Brady, Press Secretary to Ronald Reagan
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1. Introduction
There is a large literature on social learning in which consumers make inferences about
the quality of a good by observing what other consumers have done in the past. Baner-
jee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) analyze the case in which a
sequence of identical individuals consume once and prices are fixed. Bose, Orosel, Ot-
taviani and Vesterland (1992a,b) extend the analysis to the case in which a monopoly
seller facing a sequence of identical one-time buyers behaves strategically in setting his
price.12 In this paper we integrate social learning into a more standard sequential search
environment.3 We consider an infinite horizon problem in which a large number of firms
with diﬀering qualities face a large number of repeat buyers who make inferences about
the quality of firms that other individuals have patronized in the past. Buyers are het-
erogeneous, and correct inference of an uninformed individual depends on which buyers
are better informed, which in turn depends on the (endogenous) frequencies of purchase
decisions.
We consider a market environment in which consumers are initially uninformed
about firms’ qualities, but will know a firm’s quality perfectly after purchasing once.
Some individuals consume more frequently than others, hence are on average better
informed about quality. When uninformed consumers can identify those who are likely
to purchase more frequently, they will optimally emulate a frequent purchaser.4 Because
of the follow-on business of these frequent purchasers, they will (in equilibrium) be
rewarded by firms they patronize. This will happen even though they do not pay more
than others, and the price they pay does not cover the costs of the preferential treatment.
Sales to these more frequent purchasers are in a sense "loss-leaders".
In our model consumers are heterogeneous with respect to income, which is assumed
1Other work on social learning that is less related to the current paper includes Smallwood and
Conlisk (1979) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) who consider information transmission of consumption
choices or consumption outcomes, respectively, between boundedly rational consumers. Banerjee and
Fudenberg (2004) extend this to word-of-mouth communication among rational agents.
2There is research in other fields on the degree to which consumer choice is influenced by other people.
See Rogers (1995) for an overview over the marketing literature and for contributions to consumer
research and reference groups see e.g. Bearden and Etzel (1982), Bearden et al. (1989) and Burnkrant
and Cousineau (1975). In psychology see e.g. Cohen and Golden (1972) and Pincus and Waters (1977).
3Social learning has received little attention in sequential search. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995)
analyze a model in which boundedly rational agents make repeated purchases, but due to the decision
rule it can be reinterpreted as a model with finitely-lived agents who choose only at the beginning of
their life based on a sample of other agents’ utility in the previous period.
4The idea that quality might only be varified through purchases and subsequent consumption goes
back at least to Nelson’s (1970) concept of experience goods. He suggests that the pattern of an
individual’s repeated purchases might not be random, but incorporate the information of others, a
process he terms guided sampling. We formalize the idea that this guiding might evolve endogenously
with firms strategically engaged in the guided sampling.
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observable. We assume that the good of unknown quality is normal, so the relatively
wealthy consume more frequently, all else equal, and acquire information faster. Each
consumer observes the choices of some other customers in the market. Individuals who
have not found a product of acceptable quality have an incentive to buy from the same
firms as the customers they observe, in the hope that those customers made informed
decisions. When wealthier customers acquire information faster, other customers will
follow their decisions rather than the decisions of poorer customers, if they observe both.
Wealthier customers will then attract additional business to the firm they patronize. If
the firm can enhance the buying experience of a customer by providing costly service,
it will provide the service to their customers who purchase more frequently, both to
prevent them from switching to a competitor or to induce them to consume more fre-
quently. While typically wealthier customers receive preferential treatment, there may
be additional equilibria in which special service is given to less aﬄuent consumers. This
arises because service reinforces the learning process, and exclusive service to the poorer
consumers can lead them to purchase more frequently than the wealthy. This can only
arise if service is suﬃciently important.
In the analysis we focus on diﬀerences in income as the only source of heterogeneity
between consumers. We will show that in a simple setting this translates into diﬀerent
opportunity costs in the search process. It will become clear in the analysis that the
diﬀerence in the opportunity cost drives the results. Thus, whenever there is consumer
heterogeneity that leads to one group consuming more frequently, uninformed consumers
will follow the choices of members of the frequently-consuming group when possible. If
the diﬀerence is observable, our model can be interpreted more broadly as an analysis of
the interplay between consumer search and firm competition in a market with two-sided
heterogeneity and service as the competitive strategic variable.5
We focus on income or wealth as the basis of heterogeneity for two reasons. First,
for normal goods higher income is associated with higher consumption, which is the
driving force of information acquisition in our model. Second, while income or wealth
might be diﬃcult to observe and usually have to be inferred by secondary characteristics,
this might still be easier than to observe somebody’s taste preferences. Observability is
crucial in this setup since it is essential to a consumer’s decision about whom to follow.6
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 derives the equilibrium. To reduce complexity of the analysis, we postpone interesting
but straightforward discussions of the role of conspicuous consumption, visibility in the
market and relative position as well as some robustness checks to section 4. Omitted
5 In such a world service can in fact be reinterpreted as a price reduction, leading to price as the
competitive variable. Note also that heterogeneity of opportunity costs in our model is identical to
heterogeneity in valuations for the good.
6We discuss in the last section how conspicuous consumption may arise when wealth must be inferred
rather than being directly observed.
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proofs and derivations are provided in the appendix.
2. The model
This section sets out the model and the equilibrium concept, followed by a discussion
of the main modelling choices. There is a countably infinite number of periods and a
continuum I of consumers and a continuum J of firms. Consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to their per-period income. Each consumer i ∈ I has a type θi ∈ {p,w},
indicating whether he is poor or wealthy. The proportion of wealthy consumers with
income yw is α ∈ (0, 1). The other consumers have income yp < yw.
Firms are infinitely lived and heterogenous with respect to the quality q ∈ {ql, qh},
ql < qh, of the otherwise identical good that they produce. We denote the proportion
of firms with quality qh by λ ∈ (0, 1).
Consumers’ types are public information. A firm’s type is initially known only to
the firm, and is fully revealed to a consumer after consumption of the firm’s output.
Consumers die each period with probability (1 − δ); when a consumer dies, a new
consumer of the same type is born; new agents know only the proportion of high quality
firms.
The firm’s problem
Each firm j ∈ J supplies an indivisible good, the quality of which is exogenous and
unchanging over time. The market price of the good, P > 0, is exogenously given and
identical for all firms.7 Our focus is on firms’ interest in attracting customers, and for
simplicity we assume that the good can be produced costlessly. We assume that the firm
chooses whether to provide service to a given customer, and denote the level of service
by s ∈ {0, s¯}, s¯ > 0, where 0 denotes no service. At the time of service provision, the
customer is already locked in and cannot switch to a competitor for the current period.
The cost c(s¯) of providing service is c and is incurred in the period in which the service
is provided. We assume c > P. There is no cost to the firm if service is not provided,
i.e. c(0) = 0.
Firms can commit to any current customer to give service the next time he returns.
More specifically, we model firm j’s choice stj,i in period t for consumer i as representing
the firm’s one-period-ahead service commitment. stj,i is the promise to provide this
service level in the first period τ > t that the customer returns. First period service is
zero.
Let Itj(θ) be the set of consumers of type θ consuming products of firm j in period
t, and sˆtj,i the service that firm j actually provides to consumer i in period t. Then firm
7We argue in the discussion section that the price could be endogenized without qualitatively aﬀecting
our results.
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j0s per period profit is
πtj =
Z
i∈Itj(w)
P − c(sˆtj,i)di+
Z
i∈Itj(p)
P − c(sˆtj,i)di.
Firms maximize the discounted present value of per period profits,
P∞
t=0 β
tEπtj .
The cost of the provision of service is shown in the per period profit expression above
while the benefits are indirect. A firm that promises service to an individual consumer
may deter the consumer from switching to a competitor or may increase the frequency
with which he patronizes the firm. Furthermore, the consumer’s choice may aﬀect the
future choices of others. These (potential) benefits to a firm that provides service are
reflected in the size of the set of consumers who consume at the firm in the future. As
a tie-breaking rule we assume that firms oﬀer service when indiﬀerent.
The consumer’s problem
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to income, but all can aﬀord the product.
That is, yw > yp > P. Income is non-storable. In each period t ∈ T each consumer i ∈ I
has the two choices: Enter the market or not, and if entering the market, from which
firm to consume. If he does not enter, that is, does not purchase the good, he spends
his income on a numeraire good. Since income is non-storable and the price of the
numeraire is normalized to one, the consumer obtains y units of the numeraire in the
case that he does not consume in the market, and y − P units if he does.
At the beginning of each period, before the consumption decision is made, a taste
shock ρ is realized for each consumer that aﬀects the degree to which he enjoys con-
suming the indivisible good in that period. We assume this shock is an i.i.d. draw from
distribution F with density f and full support on [ρ, ρ¯], where −∞ ≤ ρ < ρ¯ ≤ ∞. If the
consumer decides to enter the market and consume from firm j in period t, his utility
in that period is
U t = qj + sˆtj + ρ
t + u(y − P ),
where qj is the quality of firm j, sˆtj is the service that he receives and ρ
t is the current
period taste shock. u(.) denotes the utility derived from the numeraire, which is assumed
to be increasing and strictly concave.
If the consumer is uninformed and chooses a firm randomly, his expected utility is
EU t = Ej [qj ] + ρt + u(y − P ).
If the consumer decides not to consume, his utility for that period is U t = u(y). Con-
sumers maximize the expected discounted utility
P∞
t=0 δ
tEU t, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
probability of survival.
We assume that observing other consumers’ behavior partially substitutes for an
individual’s initial lack of information about product qualities. After the first time
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a consumer purchases the indivisible good, he can costlessly observe at which firm a
random wealthy consumer and a random poor consumer consumed in the previous
period.8 This implies that only players who participated in the market in the previous
period are observable. For ease of exposition we assume that if a consumer is indiﬀerent
between following other participants’ choices observed at diﬀerent periods, he follows
the most recent observation.
Equilibrium
In the spirit of Markov perfection we are interested in equilibria in which firms
and consumers base their decisions only on information that is relevant for their future
payoﬀs. We also restrict attention to anonymous strategies which condition only on
the type (i.e., wealthy or poor) but not on the name of other players. For firms, the
minimal payoﬀ relevant information is the type of the consumer. We therefore consider
equilibrium strategies s(θ) in which the service commitment of a firm is a function
of the consumer’s type. We will consider symmetric pure strategies, that is, s(θ) is
deterministic and the same for firms with the same type. We denote by sl(·) the strategy
for low and by sh(·) the strategy for high quality firms.
For a consumer, the relevant information is the combination of quality and service
he can obtain; the name of the firm(s) from which he can receive that combination is not
important. Consequently, a consumer conditions his actions on D ⊆ {ql, qh} × {0, s¯},
where D denotes the various quality-service combinations he has experienced. If the
consumer has not yet purchased, D = ∅. A strategy for a consumer of type θ ∈ {p,w}
is then a tuple (ρˆθ(D), σθ(D)) for all D. The term ρˆθ(D) denotes a reservation value
for the taste shock: If the taste shock is above ρˆθ(D), the consumer buys the product,
otherwise he does not.9 If he chooses to buy, σθ(D) specifies the choice of firm from
which he purchases the good. If D 6= ∅, then the consumer can return to a firm with
quality-service combination (q, s) ∈ D, he can follow the choice of either a wealthy or a
poor player observed in the previous period, or he can search randomly for a new firm.
If D = ∅ only the last option is available, as by assumption the consumer must search
on his own in the first period of consumption.
Let nθ,t(D) denote the measure of type θ consumers with information D at time t,
where the law of motion is determined by the strategies of consumers and firms. With
this we can define a stationary equilibrium encompassing stationary distributions (1),
8 In section 4.2 we discuss alternative signal technologies. Observing more than one player of any
type does not alter any results. Observing only a random selection of N players’ choices each period
should not alter any qualitative results as long as N is suﬃciently large.
The specification that newborn players in the market have no information about other players’ choices
prevents a situation in which everybody is following other market participants and no player is searching
randomly. The specification that only players who have consumed at least once in the market can observe
other players simplifies the analysis.
9 In the appendix we show that reservation strategies are indeed optimal in our environment.
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consumer optimality (2) and firm optimality (3):
Definition 1 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium is a tuple S =
(sl, sh, (ρˆw, σw), (ρˆp, σp), nw, np) such that
1. nθ,t(D) = nθ(D) ∀t ∀D ∀θ.
2. For each consumer of type θ, strategy (ρˆθ, σθ) is optimal in the continuation game
for all D, when the consumer takes as given the strategies and fractions of the
other players as summarized in S.
3. For each high (low) quality firm sh (sl) is optimal given S.
Discussion of modelling assumptions
We will briefly discuss the modelling choices. A discussion of alternative assumptions
and their impact on our results is relegated to section 4.2.
Firms. We allow one-period-ahead commitment in order to eliminate implausible
equilibria. In particular, without commitment there is always an equilibrium in which a
firm does not provide service because the firm cannot convince the customer that he will
also get service in the future. In that case, giving service today is costly while it does
not change the future behavior of the customer, which implies that it is unprofitable
to provide service today. Therefore, even if the firm would like to give service to deter
the customer from switching to a competitor or to encourage the customer to consume
more frequently, it omits service because it cannot aﬀect the customer’s belief about
future service through current period action. This arises no matter how profitable the
business with this customer is. We restrict attention to time-independent firm strategies
to focus on the eﬀects of information transmission and to abstract from repeated game
eﬀects. Without commitment, this implicitly restricts the beliefs of the consumer to
be unaﬀected by current period actions, rendering current period service an ineﬀective
tool to change consumer behavior. Limited commitment power, i.e., commitment only
for the next time in which the customer returns, provides a tool by which a customer’s
beliefs about future service can be altered. This allows firms to provide service if
the business with the consumer is suﬃciently profitable. In the last section we argue
that the equilibrium with commitment will also be an equilibrium of the game without
commitment when we allow for non-Markovian strategies.
The assumption that no service is given during the first period of consumption at
a firm is also due to our restriction to Markovian strategies. If firms have a choice to
give more service than promised, they would not do so since they cannot influence the
consumer’s future behavior. Since there is no commitment to service in the first period,
they would not provide any service.
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Taking prices as exogenously given allows us to focus on private information that
is not fully revealed through prices. That prices do not reveal all relevant information
about products is widely accepted. Strong restrictions on pricing behavior are therefore
common in models of this sort to preclude revelation of too much information (see,
for example, Wolinsky (1990)). On the other hand we can, with slight modification,
interpret the service as a price reduction. In this sense we do allow for price competition.
We discuss the possibility of price competition further in section 4.2.
Consumers. The combination of the numeraire good as an alternative to market
consumption and the taste shock together explicitly capture the idea that the good
under consideration is a normal good. The opportunity cost of going into the market is
u0 := u(y)− u(y − P ),
that is, the opportunity cost of foregone consumption of the numeraire good. Denote
this opportunity cost uw0 for the wealthy and u
p
0 for the poor. The strict concavity of
u(·) then implies that uw0 < up0, that is, the wealthy have a lower opportunity cost of
consumption than the poor.10 Without service the wealthy will therefore consume at
lower values of the taste shock than the poor. Thus, on average the wealthy consume
more often, which establishes our version of the normal goods assumption.11
The taste shock also allows firms to encourage the customer to consume more fre-
quently. The timing of when to consume in the market is not exogenously fixed, but
rather depends on the current period taste shock and the utility of consumption. By
promising service, the firms can raise the utility of consumption and can thus encourage
a consumer to consume more frequently.
Our results are most interesting when c > P. In this case no consumer will receive
service only because of his own consumption at a firm. Firms will only provide service
because a consumer brings in additional customers who follow his lead. Consequently,
this case clearly highlights the eﬀects of information transmission in the market.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium concept requires optimality in the continuation after
a deviation to ensure that the firms’ service promises aﬀect behavior.
10Players get in each period y−P units of the numeraire for sure, independent of their current period
choice. Therefore wealthy players consumption-independent level of the numeraire is higher. Only the
additional amount that they might get, i.e. their opportunity cost, is lower. The term u(y − P ) in the
utility function will be dropped for all subsequent calculations as it only reflects a constant.
11Heterogeneity in the opportunity costs of consumption (rather than the heterogeneity in terms of
income) can be taken as primitive to allow for more general interpretations of the model. See section
4.1 for a discussion.
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3. Optimal Behavior
As a first step to characterizing the stationary equilibria of this game, in the following
subsection we describe the optimal consumption behavior of a single consumer. Toward
this end, we consider a partial problem in which the service provision by firms and the
information in the market is exogenous. In the next subsection we endogenize the market
information, still under the assumption that firms service provision is exogenously given.
The subsequent subsection analyzes the behavior of the firms. Finally, we integrate the
parts in the analysis of the equilibria.
3.1. Consumer Search
Consider a consumer with opportunity cost u0 who has entered the market at least
once, that is, he will observe other participants in the market. Suppose all high quality
firms oﬀer identical service s (either s¯ or zero) to this consumer in every period, and
low quality firms do not oﬀer more service than high quality firms.12 If the consumer
has not found a high quality firm and chooses to purchase from a firm that he hasn’t
previously frequented, there is a probability which we denote γ that this firm will be of
high quality. We take for now as exogenous the process by which this consumer chooses
a new firm, and hence γ.
We are interested in the optimal decision rule of the consumer. The problem is a
standard search problem with one exception — the consumer does not search in every
period. Rather, the choice to enter the market is endogenous and depends on the taste
shock, where high taste shocks imply that he enjoys consumption of the indivisible good
relatively more than when the taste shock is low. It also depends on the qualities and
service promises of the firms he has encountered, as well as on his beliefs about the
service he will be promised by firms he has not yet encountered. The decisions about
how frequently to search and how to choose firms given the frequency of search are
interlinked: a higher frequency of search eﬀectively implies a higher discount factor in
the choice of firms. Higher quality or higher service imply a higher value of consumption,
thus increasing the frequency of consumption.
Using standard techniques, appropriately modified to this setting, we derive cutoﬀ
levels ρˆl and ρˆh for the taste shock as functions of the quality of the best firm encountered
so far, for which the consumer is indiﬀerent between consuming in the market and not
consuming. When the consumer has only experienced low quality firms, he will enter the
market only if his taste shock ρ exceeds the cutoﬀ ρˆl, and his frequency of consumption
is thus (1− F (ρˆl)). If the customer has experienced at least one high quality firm, his
12We will later show that it is always profitable for a high-quality firm to provide service if it is
profitable for a low-quality firm to provide service. Therefore this specification will be the relevant case.
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relevant cutoﬀ is ρˆh and his frequency becomes (1− F (ρˆh)). Both ρˆl and ρˆh depend on
the service strategies of the firms.
To ensure that a cutoﬀ exists that leads to this indiﬀerence, we make the following
assumption on the support of the taste shock that we will retain throughout: (ρ, ρ¯) ⊃
[uw0 −qh−s¯, u
p
0−ql]. This implies that ρ+qh+s¯ < uw0 , i.e., even in the most advantageous
situation of high quality and high service, there are taste shocks suﬃciently low such
that not consuming is preferable. Similarly, it implies that ql + ρ¯ > u
p
0, so that even
in the most disadvantageous situation some taste shocks still induce the consumer to
enter the market. Requiring the support to be suﬃciently large avoids the discussion of
boundary cases. Note that we consider diﬀerent ranges for s¯ in some of our statements.
If a range conflicts the first inequality, it is vacuous by assumption. Yet for any shock
distribution that has unbounded lower support, i.e. ρ = −∞, the inequality above does
not restrict s¯ in any way and all ranges that we consider are possible.
Before stating the results on the consumer’s search behavior, it should be noted
that the consumer might not search for high quality firms if all firms oﬀer service since
the consumer does not receive service in his first period of consumption at a firm. If
he returns to a low quality firm, he will receive service immediately, while he will not
receive any service if he continues searching for a high quality firm until he consumes
at least twice at such a firm. However, if service is not too important, or the consumer
is suﬃciently patient, he will search for high quality firms rather than remaining with
a low quality firm. We summarize this in the following lemma, which is proven in the
appendix.
Lemma 1 If all firms oﬀer service, there exists δ ∈ [0, 1) such that for δ ≥ δ the
consumer searches for high quality. If s¯ < γ(qh − ql), consumers always search for high
quality firms, i.e. δ = 0.
The following lemma describes the optimal service strategy for the consumer. Recall
that s denotes the service promised by high quality firms to this consumer, which is
assumed weakly larger than the service promised by low quality firms. Let
ρˆl = u0 −Eγ(q)−
δγ
1− δ
Z ρˆl
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ (3.1)
where Eγ(q) = γql + (1− γ)qh. Let the state variable q be the best quality yet encoun-
tered. Then we obtain:
Lemma 2 If δ ∈ (δ, 1) and high quality firms oﬀer weakly higher service, then the
consumer’s optimal decision rule has the following structure:
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If q = ql, sample a new firm if current period shock ρ ≥ ρˆl, otherwise don’t consume.
If q = qh, then return to the firm with high quality if the current period shock ρ ≥ ρˆh =
u0 − qh − s, otherwise don’t consume.
Intuitively these cutoﬀs are easy to understand. At high qualities the consumer
either gets u0 or qh + s + ρ, and he chooses the higher. At low qualities the trade-oﬀ
is similar, except that consumption yields only the average quality Eγ(q). However, at
low qualities there is a future benefit of today’s experimentation: Finding a high quality
firm yields benefits in future periods of consumption and, thereby, also induces a higher
frequency of consumption in the future. These benefits are reflected in the increment
in consumption frequency in the last term on the right hand side of (3.1).
The primary interest in the lemma stems from its implications for the behavior of
wealthy consumers, i.e., those with the lower opportunity cost, relative to the behavior
of poorer consumers. To compare the two groups, consider a setting where high quality
firms promise service sh(p) to poor consumers and sh(w) to wealthy consumers, and
low quality firms oﬀer at most this level of service: sh(·) ≥ sl(·). Let ρˆpl and ρˆph be
the threshold levels for a poor consumer, and ρˆwl and ρˆ
w
h be the threshold levels for a
wealthy consumer. The following lemma compares these cutoﬀ values:
Lemma 3 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1) and sh(·) ≥ sl(·).
1) If sh(w) ≥ sh(p), then the wealthy consume more frequently than the poor: ρˆwl ≤ ρˆ
p
l
and ρˆwh ≤ ρˆ
p
h.
2 a) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ < up0 − uw0 , still ρˆwl < ρˆ
p
l and ρˆ
w
h < ρˆ
p
h.
2 b) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > up0 − uw0 , then ρˆwh > ρˆ
p
h.
There exists unique ξγ > u
p
0 − uw0 such that ρˆwl < ρˆ
p
l if s¯ < ξγ and ρˆ
w
l > ρˆ
p
l if
s¯ > ξγ.
Proof: The result for the cutoﬀ ρˆh follows directly from ρˆ
θ
h = u
θ
0 − qh − sh(θ),
θ ∈ {p,w}. For ρˆl, rewrite (3.1) as ρˆθl −uθ0+Eγ(q) = − δγ1−δ
R ρˆθl
uθ0−qh−sh(θ)
[1−F (ρ)]dρ and
observe that the left hand side is increasing in ρˆθl and decreasing in u
θ
0 and the right
hand side is decreasing in ρˆθl and increasing in u
θ
0 − sh(θ). For 1) and 2a) the wealthy
have lower uθ0 and u
θ
0 − sh(θ), therefore their cutoﬀ ρˆwl must be lower for the equality
to hold. For 2b), if up0− sh(p) ≈ uw0 − sh(w), then ρˆwl < ρˆ
p
l since u
w
0 < u
p
0. Since ρˆ
p
l is by
(3.1) strictly increasing and unbounded in s¯ when sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ but ρˆhl is constant,
there exists a unique ξγ such that ρˆ
w
l = ρˆ
p
l if s¯ = ξγ . Q.E.D.
If wealthy and poor consumers are treated equally by firms, this result simply re-
states our formulation of the normal goods assumption. The wealthy consume more
frequently both in the search phase and after they have found a high quality firm. The
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explicit formulation allows us to compare the frequency of consumption even in the
cases where consumers are treated diﬀerently by firms. As long as the service bene-
fit does not outweigh the diﬀerences in the opportunity costs of consumption, wealthy
consumers still consume more frequently even if poor consumers are treated preferen-
tially. If the impact of service outweighs the diﬀerence in the opportunity costs, the
frequency of consumption at high quality firms becomes larger for the poor than for the
wealthy. This does not necessarily translate into a higher frequency of consumption at
low quality firms. As long as consumers are searching they do not obtain service, and
without service the wealthy have a stronger incentive to consume. Only if the service at
high quality firms is suﬃciently attractive, poor consumers search more frequently for
high qualities than the wealthy. Otherwise it still means that wealthy consumers find
high quality firms relatively faster, even if service outweighs the exogenous diﬀerence in
opportunity costs.
We turn next to endogenizing the probability γ.
3.2. Consumers’ stationary behavior
In equilibrium, both high and low quality firms decide whether to provide service to
each of the two types of consumers. Before examining the full model, we take the firms’
choices regarding service as fixed and examine consumers’ behavior in steady state as
they choose optimally, given firms’ choices. We will again consider the case where all
high quality firms oﬀer weakly higher service than low quality firms.
In this case all consumers, wealthy and poor, will sample in a way that gives the
highest probability of identifying a high quality firm. Thus, both the uninformed wealthy
consumers and the uninformed poor follow the same group. The probability of drawing
a high quality firm, γ, when following consumers of this group (which we will call
"leaders") is now endogenous. γ depends on the particular stationary equilibrium we
are looking at.
We note that following any consumer, wealthy or poor, is preferable to searching
randomly. At worst, that consumer who is followed has not found a high quality firm
yet, in which case the firm he or she purchased from is as likely to be high quality as
a randomly sampled firm. In addition, there is positive probability that the consumer
who is being mimicked has found a high quality firm and purchases only from that
firm. Hence, it is strictly better to follow any other consumer than to sample randomly;
thus, in any equilibrium γ ≥ λ. Due to this inequality δ in lemma 1 can be established
independent of the exact value of γ, and long-lived consumers indeed search for high
qualities.
An individual who follows the leaders sees only those who have consumed in the
previous period. The probability that this individual will find a high quality firm is the
proportion γ of the leaders who have identified a high quality firm and who consumed
June 6, 2006 13
in the previous period. When the wealthy identify high quality firms with probability
γ when following the leaders, a fraction γw of the wealthy who consume in any given
period will purchase from a high quality firm. We will first show how γw is determined.
If the wealthy themselves are the leaders, we then have to show that γ = γw, i.e. that
a fixed point exists. Given also that the poor follow the leaders, a fraction γp of the
poor who purchase in any given period will do so from a high quality firm. If the poor
are the leaders, the fixed point will be γ = γp. The goal of this section is to establish
conditions under which γw > γp and vice versa. This will determine which group is
being followed, since an uninformed consumer will follow the group with the higher γθ.
To calculate γθ, θ ∈ {p,w}, we will consider each group individually. We will focus
on the wealthy, but the derivations for the poor are analogous when replacing w with
p. In the first period in which a wealthy person consumes, he samples a firm randomly
and has probability λ of drawing a high quality. In every period thereafter he draws
a high quality firm with probability γ whenever he searches. To derive the stationary
distribution we must keep track of the proportion of wealthy consumers whose best
quality encountered so far is ql, qh or ∅ respectively, where ∅ stands for those who have
not yet consumed. In period t denote these by nw,tl , n
w,t
h and n
w,t
∅ .
The relevant flow equations can then be constructed as follows: In period t + 1
consumers who have not tried any product include all newborns and those consumers
who had not yet consumed at the beginning of period t, did not consume a product in
period t and survived:
nw,t+1∅ = (1− δ) + δF (ρˆ
w
∅ )n
w,t
∅ , (3.2)
where F (ρˆw∅ ) > 0 is the probability that a wealthy person who does not yet observe
other market participants does not consume in the market. The cutoﬀ ρˆw∅ is analytically
complicated,13 but our specification that in addition to the newborn, all consumers prior
to their first purchase lack information about other market participants, eliminates
F (ρˆw∅ ) in the derivation of γ
w.
Wealthy consumers in t+ 1 who have state variable ql include those without infor-
mation at the beginning of period t who consumed a product in t, drew quality ql and
survived; those who had not found a satisfactory quality before t, drew quality ql in t
and survived; and those survivors from the prior period who did not consume a product
13For a given γ, the taste shock ρˆw∅ is characterized by the indiﬀerence of the customer between
going into the market and sampling a random firm vs. taking his outside option. If he goes into
the market, his continuation payoﬀ EVρ0(q, ρ0) is given in the appendix in (5.2) and (5.4). Let X =
λ [(1− δ)qh + δEVρ0(qh, ρ0)] + (1 − λ) [(1− δ)ql + δEVρ0(ql, ρ0)], then ρˆw∅ ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) is characterized by
[1− δF (ρˆw∅ )][(1− δ)ρˆw∅ +X] = (1− δ)uw0 + δ
k
(1− F (ρˆw∅ ))X +
U ρ¯
ρˆw∅
ρdF (ρ)
l
.
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and had experienced quality ql before:
nw,t+1l = δ
£
1− F (ρˆw∅ )
¤
(1− λ)nw,t∅ (3.3)
+δ [1− F (ρˆwl )] (1− γ)n
w,t
l
+δF (ρˆwl )n
w,t
l
The cutoﬀ ρˆwl is given by (3.1) under the opportunity cost u
w
0 .
Finally, the people who have state variable qh constitute
nw,t+1h = δ
£
1− F (ρˆw∅ )
¤
λnw,t∅ (3.4)
+δ [1− F (ρˆwl )] γn
w,t
l
+δnw,th
which is similar to (3.3) except for the last line: Since at qh people return to the same
firm, their state variable is qh regardless of whether they consumed last period.
Stationarity is characterized by nw,t
0
ω = n
w,t
ω = nwω for all t and t0 and ω ∈ {∅, l, h}.
We can use equations (3.2) to (3.4) to get
nw∅ =
(1− δ)
1− δ + δAw , (3.5)
nwl =
δn∅Aw(1− λ)
1− δ + δγBw , (3.6)
and
nwh =
1
1− δ
δn∅Aw[(1− δ)λ+ δγBw]
1− δ + δγBw , (3.7)
where Aw ≡ [1−F (ρˆw∅ )] represents the frequency of consumption for a wealthy consumer
who has never consumed the product before, and Bw ≡ 1 − F (ρˆwl ) represents the
frequency of consumption for a wealthy consumer who has only experienced low quality
firms. Since γw represents the fraction of wealthy consumer who consumed in a period
who have found a high quality firm, we must find the measure of consumers who actually
consume in any given period. Denote by ϕwl (ϕ
w
h ) the measure of wealthy consumers
who consume at low quality (high quality) firms in any given period in the steady state.
In any period the consumers who consume at ql are all the uninformed players nw∅
who consume with probability Aw = [1−F (ρˆw∅ )] and draw a low quality with probability
(1 − λ), plus all informed players who have not found a high quality firm, nwl , who
consume with frequency Bw = [1−F (ρˆwl )] and draw a low quality firm with probability
(1− γ). Thus we have
ϕwl = n
w
∅ A
w(1− λ) + nwl Bw(1− γ). (3.8)
June 6, 2006 15
For ϕwh , we have similar terms for the uniformed and unsatisfied players, plus an addi-
tional term reflecting those people who had already found a firm of satisfactory quality
in the past, nwh , times their frequency of consumption C
w ≡ [1− F (uw0 − qh − sh(w))].
Therefore
ϕwh = n
w
∅ A
wλ+ nwl B
wγ + nwhC
w.
Since γw = ϕ
w
h
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
we get
1− γw = ϕ
w
l
ϕwl + ϕ
w
h
=
nw∅ A
w(1− λ) + nwl Bw(1− γ)
nw∅ A
w + nwl Bw + n
w
hCw
, (3.9)
where again Aw, Bw and Cw represent the frequencies of consumption for those wealthy
consumers who have not consumed from any firm before, those who have only experi-
enced low quality firms and those who have previously experienced a high quality firm,
respectively. Substituting the value for nw∅ , n
w
l and n
w
h from equations (3.5) to (3.7) and
rearranging yields an expression for γw that is independent of the initial frequency Aw,
i.e.
γw = 1− [1− δ + δB
w] [1− λ]
1− δ + δ(1− λ+ γ)Bw +
h
δλ+ δ
2
1−δB
wγ
i
Cw
(3.10)
for a given ρˆwl , which is implicitly defined in equation (3.1) in lemma 2.
The proof of the following lemma, which is left to the appendix, shows that there is
a fixed point γw = γ.
Lemma 4 There exists a fixed point γw = γ, γ ∈ (λ, 1), in equation (3.10) such that
equation (3.1) is also satisfied.
We argued above that it is always better to follow some group than to sample
randomly. Therefore in a stationary equilibrium, γ = γw or γ = γp, where γp is
constructed analogously. While an uninformed consumer does better by following any
other consumer than searching randomly, one should expect that it is better to follow
a wealthy consumer than a poor consumer. Suppose that the level of service oﬀered to
wealthy consumers is at least as large as the service oﬀered to poor consumers. Then
while uninformed, the wealthy will consume more frequently than the poor, and hence,
will discover a high quality firm more quickly.
While this argument is appealing, it is not trivial. The wealthy search more often at
low quality firms in any period, diluting the visibility of the wealthy who have identified
a high quality firm. Partial diﬀerentiation of (3.10) reveals that ∂γw/∂Bw > 0 if γ > λ,
and therefore the dilution eﬀect does not outweigh the greater frequency with which
they consume. If the frequency of consumption while searching for a high quality firm
increases for either group, this unambiguously increases the quality of their signal.
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Nevertheless, the visibility induced through the frequency of consumption is important:
If the poor is the group that receives service (which we will show is only possible if
service is suﬃciently valuable), then it is possible that the poor consume less frequently
prior to identifying a high quality firm than the wealthy, but it is nevertheless better
to follow the poor. The reason is that the poor consume much more frequently at high
quality firms, and therefore those who have identified a high quality firm are a greater
proportion than the proportion of wealthy who have identified a high quality firm.
We summarize this in the following proposition the proof of which is left to the
appendix. Recall that ξγ was introduced in lemma 3 as the threshold on service below
which the poor search less frequently at low qualities even if they are the ones that
receive service.
Proposition 1 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1) and γ ∈ (λ, 1) Consider a candidate stationary equilib-
rium with sh(·) ≥ sl(·). Then there exists ξˆγ ∈ (up0 − uw0 , ξγ) such that
1) If sh(w) ≥ sh(p), then γw > γp > λ.
2 a) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ < ξˆγ , still γw > γp > λ.
2 b) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > ξˆγ , then γp > γw > λ.
The proposition establishes a bound on the importance of service below which all
consumers will follow wealthy consumers. Only if s¯ exceeds this bound could it be
preferable to follow the poor.
3.3. Firms’ behavior
We next analyze service provision by the firms. We establish that it is profitable for
the firm to provide service to some type of consumers if they are followed by suﬃciently
many consumers of the other type. We also prove that high quality firms will always
provide at least as high a service level as low quality firms, which we have so far taken
as exogenous. A key observation for this result is that in any stationary equilibrium, if a
high-quality firm promises in any period service s¯ to a consumer, then the consumer will
return to this firm the next period he enters the market, regardless of his expectations
about future service. The intuition behind this observation is that accepting the optimal
per-period outcome of high quality and high service and searching thereafter for a new
firm yields higher utility than searching immediately. Therefore, high-quality firms can
always ensure the return of a consumer by promising him service. The question in this
section is when this will be profitable.
Our first result concerns the equilibrium profit contribution of a customer. In a
stationary equilibrium, a consumer who purchases from a firm has the same expected
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number of followers in every period. Thus, the benefit to a firm of a single visit of a
particular customer is the following: He pays price P , potentially receives service at
cost c > P , and induces the expected discounted lifetime equilibrium profit that the
firm generates from his next-period followers. Call this benefit Π. Π is an equilibrium
object that depends on the strategies of the firm in question as well as the strategies of
other firms and consumers. If a firm deviates and promises s0 instead of the equilibrium
promise s, the benefit of the next return visit is Π− (c(s0)− c(s)). Since in a stationary
equilibrium after a one shot deviation the continuation game is unchanged once the
customer returns, only the immediate cost of service changes from c(s) to c(s0). In
particular, the behavior of the customer once he returns as well as the behavior of the
followers is unchanged.14 For example, promising no service instead of service in any
period changes the benefit of the next visit of the consumer from Π to Π + c, as the
firm saves the service costs next time. Yet it might delay the consumer’s return, as now
consumption is less valuable compared to the opportunity cost of consumption. If the
consumer switches to a competitor, Π+ c will in fact never be realized.
Consequently, if a particular consumer generates suﬃcient indirect profit it will pay
a firm to promise that consumer service to induce him to purchase more frequently. In
addition, Proposition 1 provides conditions under which it is optimal to follow consumers
of type θ. If the fraction of this leading group is not too large, the spillover benefits
of the followers will make it profitable for high quality firms to provide service to the
leaders. We state this formally in the next proposition.
Moreover, we establish that it is indeed optimal for high quality firms to outbid low
quality firms in their pursuit of valuable customers. We show that if it is profitable for a
low wage firm to provide service to a consumer, it is also profitable for a high wage firm to
provide service in order to keep the business of this consumer. In Lemma 1 we showed
that if consumers are suﬃciently long-lived, that is, δ ∈ (δ, 1), they will continue to
search for a high quality firm rather than return to a low quality firm. This was derived
under the assumption that high quality firms oﬀer at least weakly more service. The
result here establishes that this assumption is indeed fulfilled. We summarize this in
the following proposition, the proof of which is relegated to the appendix. For more
compact notation of the proposition, let αw = α and αp = 1− α.
Proposition 2 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1).
14This is a consequence of the assumption of markov perfection which is embedded in the requirement
that the equilibrium service strategy does not depend on past histories. In the situations that we analyze
the consumer is not indiﬀerent between his choices of searching for a new firm or returning to a previous
firm. Furthermore, the decision situation is eﬀectively unchanged compared to on the equilibrium path
play once he returns after a one-shot deviation. Taken together, this implies that his continuation
strategy once he returns will be his on-the-equilibrium-path strategy.
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i ) Suppose all uninformed consumers follow consumers of type θ. Then there exists
α¯ > 0 such that for αθ < α¯, in any stationary equilibrium sh(θ) = s¯.
ii) In any stationary equilibrium, either sh(θ) ≥ sl(θ) for θ ∈ {p,w}; or sh(θ) < sl(θ)
but type θ consumers nevertheless do not return to low quality firms.
We should point out that two forces can lead to high-quality firms’ willingness to
provide service. One is competitive pressure. If other high-quality firms oﬀer service,
then if a single firm does not provide service, the consumer might not return, preferring
to search for another firm that provides service. The second is the encouragement
eﬀect, that is, the consumer returns more frequently when he is oﬀered service. In our
model the encouragement eﬀect is important to sustain a high-service equilibrium. That
is due to the Markovian assumption on the firms’ strategies which implies that service
provision only depends on the consumer type, and not on the firm’s own or other players’
past actions. In an equilibrium in which the high-quality firms are supposed to promise
service, the firm’s strategy specifies oﬀering service again in the continuation game even
if it deviated for a period and did not oﬀer service. After a deviation a consumer will
therefore still expect to get a service promise the next time he consumes there (even
though he will not get any actual service provided in that period) and it is better for him
to return than to search for a new firm in which he also will not receive any service in
the first period of consumption, but might draw a low quality. Therefore, the consumer
would return even if service is not provided for one period. The motivation for high
quality firms to oﬀer service then comes from the encouragement eﬀect. If we impose
less stringent assumptions on the equilibrium (in particular, dropping the restriction to
Markov strategies), the competitive forces can be very important. If consumers believe
that they will not be promised service by a firm ever again if it does not promise service
in a given period, then service provision can be sustained by the competitive threat that
consumers search for new firms that do oﬀer service, which seems intuitively appealing.
With these results on optimal strategies for consumers and firms and the steady
state derivations we now turn to the stationary equilibria of the game.
3.4. Equilibria
We first provide a necessary condition for equilibria when the value of service is not too
large. In any such equilibrium, the poor follow the wealthy, and if service is provided, it
is provided only to the wealthy. This is driven by the fact that the wealthy accumulate
information faster than the poor.
Proposition 3 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1). There exists ξ > up0 − uw0 such that for s¯ < ξ in any
stationary equilibrium all uninformed consumers follow wealthy consumers after their
initial purchase. If service is provided in equilibrium, it is only provided to the wealthy.
June 6, 2006 19
Proof: By proposition 2 higher quality firms provide weakly higher service. In
combination with lemma 1 we know that all consumers search for high quality firms.
That is, all consumers, wealthy and poor, will in equilibrium follow the distribution that
places the highest weight on high quality firms. By Proposition 1 s¯ < ξˆγ ensures that
all consumers will follow the wealthy, even if the poor receive the service. Since P < c
service is only provided (i.e., promised and then delivered) to players who have followers.
Therefore, in equilibrium only the wealthy can receive service. While ξˆγ depends on γ,
one can show that it is bounded away from up0 − uw0 for all γ ≥ λ. Q.E.D.
Whether stationary equilibria with or without service exist depends on the profit
generated by the followers that a consumer has. Since P < c service will only be provided
when the profit generated by one’s followers is suﬃciently large. We establish existence
and uniqueness separately for the cases when there are many or few poor.15 With
many poor people, the wealthy arise unambiguously as the leaders and will be provided
with service to further encourage their search externality. With few poor people there
still is always an equilibrium in which everybody follows the wealthy, but no service is
provided. Only if service suﬃciently outweighs the diﬀerence in the opportunity costs
can the poor receive service and be the leaders.
When analyzing the equilibria, we will discuss cases where a consumer is followed
mainly by consumers of his own type. It is therefore important to understand whether
this induces service or not. Consider the case where there is only one group of consumers.
Consumers without followers do not receive service, since the price of the good is lower
than the cost of providing service. If consumers do not die, i.e., δ = 1, there cannot be
a steady state in which a non-trivial fraction of consumers has not found a high quality
firm. Therefore in any steady state equilibrium, consumers do not search for new firms,
and thus consumers do not have followers. Therefore no firms will find it profitable to
provide service to any consumer, independently of the service provided by other firms.
By continuity, there exists δ∗ < 1 such that this holds for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), where δ∗ is
a function of the price P and the cost c.16 That is, there exists a value δ∗ such that
for survival rates greater than δ∗, no firm would find it profitable to provide service to
consumers who are only followed by consumers of their own type, independent of the
service promises of the other firms.
15We have not shown that the fixed point distribution when the rich follow themselves is unique. Also,
service by low quality firms might make no diﬀerence to the consumers’ search. Therefore equilibria
might not be unique, but all exhibit the properties we want to establish.
16This can also be seen by considering equation (5.9) with Np = 0 and Nr = 1 − γ, where γ is the
fixed point to equation (3.10). Since 1 − γ converges to 1 and 1−γ
1−δ to
1
1−F (ur0−qh−s¯)
for δ converging
to 1, Πrh ≈ (P − c) < 0 for δ large. The argument can be extended to low quality firms and poor
consumers, and to the case where other firms do not provide service. It remains valid even when β = δ,
i.e., the firms’ discount factor is also large.
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The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibria in an environment
when the ratio of poor to wealthy consumers is suﬃciently large. All equilibria exhibit
service only for the wealthy customers if the survival rate is suﬃciently high or service
is lower than the threshold ξ in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 Fix δ ∈ (δ, 1) and s¯ > 0. There exists α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for α ≤ α∗
the following holds:
1) There exist stationary equilibria in which all consumers follow wealthy consumers
while searching. Consumers stop searching only when they find a high quality
firm, and high quality firms oﬀer service to the wealthy and not to the poor. Low
quality firms may oﬀer service but do not attract repeat business.
2) All stationary equilibria are of this form if s¯ < ξ or if δ > δ∗ and α∗ suﬃciently
small.
Proof: Assume all players follow the wealthy when searching. Then the poor will
never be promised service by any firm that expects repeat business, as by P < c the
firm would make a loss. The wealthy will be promised service by all high quality
firms. These firms can induce the consumer to return by oﬀering service. For α∗ small
enough Proposition 2 establishes that this will be the only choice that does not have
a profitable deviation. By lemma 1 low quality firms are never repeatedly visited by a
wealthy player. It is immediate that all players have an incentive to follow the wealthy:
since sh(w) ≥ sh(p) by Proposition 1 γw > γp > λ, and following the wealthy is better
than following the poor or sampling randomly.
For s¯ < ξ no other equilibria exist, as by Proposition 3 all players follow the wealthy
and the assumption of the prior paragraph is fulfilled. If δ > δ∗, then it is not profitable
to provide service to the poor if they are followed only by other poor consumers. If
α∗ is suﬃciently small, then each poor consumer can only have a negligible number
of wealthy followers, and providing service to the poor remains unprofitable even if all
consumers follow the poor. If the poor do not receive service, they prefer to follow the
wealthy, and again the assumption of the prior paragraph is fulfilled. Q.E.D.
The proposition shows that firms indeed support the learning process when the ser-
vice can be concentrated on suﬃciently few wealthy people who achieve a high visibility
in the market. For all consumers the outcome is clearly preferred to a world in which
service is absent. Wealthy consumers benefit directly from the service and indirectly be-
cause they obtain high qualities faster. Poor customers benefit also, but only indirectly
through the improved search externality provided by the wealthy. High quality firms
benefit, because consumers find high quality firms faster. Yet their cost of providing ser-
vice might outweigh this benefit. Low quality firms unambiguously loose compared to a
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world without firms’ ability to interference with the consumers search process. Service
increases the informational externality between consumers, and a newborn consumer
tries on average fewer low quality firms before finding high quality.
As a comparison we analyze the case in which the ratio of wealthy to poor players
is reversed. If there are few poor people, there is still always an equilibrium in which
everybody follows the wealthy. Only if service is suﬃciently important is there also a
second equilibrium in which everybody follows the poor.
Proposition 5 Fix δ > max{δ, δ∗} and s¯ > 0. There exists α∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for
α ≥ α∗∗ the following holds:
1) There exist stationary equilibria in which all consumers follow wealthy consumers
while searching. Consumers stop searching only when they find a high quality
firm. High quality firms do not oﬀer service to any consumer. Low quality firms
may oﬀer service but do not attract repeat business.
2) If s¯ < ξ these are the only equilibria. There is ξ0 > up0−uw0 such that there also exist
equilibria in which all consumers follow poor consumers while searching if s¯ > ξ0.
Consumers stop searching only when they find a high quality firm. High quality
firms oﬀer service to the poor and not to the wealthy. Low quality firms may oﬀer
service but do not attract repeat business.
3) There do not exist stationary equilibria with other properties.
Proof: Assume all consumers follow the wealthy. Since δ > δ∗ the wealthy do not
receive service due to wealthy followers, and α∗∗ small enough assures there will not
be suﬃcient poor followers to warrant service.17 Also the poor do not get service.
Proposition 1 then establishes γw > γp > λ, and indeed everybody wants to follow the
poor. By Proposition 3, for s¯ < ξ there cannot be any other stationary equilibria in
which the wealthy are not being followed.
Consider a stationary equilibrium in which the poor do not follow the wealthy. It
must then be the case that the wealthy follow the poor. If the wealthy did not follow
the poor, the poor would not receive service, and everybody would follow the wealthy
as in the previous paragraph. If the wealthy follow the poor, then by lemma 2 high
quality firms would indeed want to provide service to the poor. Yet the wealthy will
only follow the poor if γp ≥ γw. By Proposition 3 this only happens for s¯ ≥ ξˆγp . Since
γp is bounded away from one for all s¯ since some newborns are always searching, it
17The contribution by the poor is δ ϕ
p
l
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
1−α
α P
k
1 + δβ
1−δβ (1− F (u
p
0 − qh))
l
. Since for a given δ
the term
ϕpl
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
is bounded from above and independent of α, the expression converges to zero as α
converges to one.
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is easy to see that ξˆγp is bounded. Therefore there exists ξ
0 such that s¯ ≥ ξ0 implies
γp ≥ γw. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 reveals the natural advantage that the wealthy possess in information
gathering. Following the wealthy is always an equilibrium, as in the absence of service
it is best for everybody to follow them. Only if service is very attractive will the poor
search enough such that following them can be worthwhile for the wealthy. As discussed
in the context of Proposition 1, service has to suﬃciently outweigh the diﬀerence in
opportunity costs, but does not need to be so high that poor consumers actually find
high qualities faster than wealthy consumers. It is worth noticing that in the case where
both types of equilibria coexist, consumers are all better oﬀ in the equilibrium where
consumers follow the poor and the poor obtain service.
Propositions 4 and 5 establish that it is the information that is revealed in the choices
of the wealthier players that makes them valuable to other players and, by extension, to
firms. If there are suﬃciently many consumers who value this information, the wealthy
are in a unique position to profit from this if service is not too valuable. Poor consumers
are not substitutes for the wealthy as their actions reveal less information than those
of the wealthy, even if the visibility of the poor is much better when there are fewer of
them. Note that we have eﬀectively ruled out trigger strategies in the analysis.18 Hence,
firms’ decisions are primarily influenced by the per period contribution of a customer.
Thus, it is not the frequency of consumption per se that allows wealthier consumers to
command service, but rather the induced information that is valued by other consumers,
and in turn by the firms.
4. Discussion
The mechanics of our model are suﬃciently transparent to allow the discussion of addi-
tional social components such as conspicuous consumption, visibility and the importance
of relative position in society. We discuss these in the next subsection. We discuss the
robustness of our results to various changes in the model assumptions in the following
subsection and then conclude.
4.1. Social Interaction
Our interpretation of the diﬀerent opportunity costs uw0 and u
p
0 has been derived from
diﬀerences in income that aﬀect the consumers’ budget constraints. For the analysis,
uw0 and u
p
0 could be taken as primitives that result from heterogeneity with respect to
18These would have allowed richer customers to impose harsher punishment on firms, as their over-
all lifetime consumption is higher and their eﬀective discount factor is higher due to more frequent
consumption.
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something other than income. They could, for example, reflect diﬀerences in tastes.
If you look for a Swedish restaurant, Swedes might have a greater preference than the
average consumer, that is, have lower u0. For running shoes, runners will consume more,
and good jazz places are likely most likely discovered by following jazz enthusiasts. While
our analysis can easily handle exogenous diﬀerences, our focus on income diﬀerences
stems from two observations. For normal goods income diﬀerences will induce higher
consumption for the wealthy. More importantly, in many situations income diﬀerences
might be easier to infer than diﬀerences in taste. If taste heterogeneity is similar for
diﬀerent income categories but only income diﬀerences are observable, then the firms’
treatment decisions and the consumers’ decisions on whom to follow will be based on
the observable characteristic.
The ability to distinguish between wealthy and poor is important in our framework.
Typically this must be inferred from some attribute, for example from the suit one
wears or the car one drives, suggesting a rational basis for conspicuous consumption.19
A standard signalling argument would explain why those who would like to consume
more frequently would rationally choose to spend the money for a Rolex watch if it leads
to greater service while less frequent purchasers would not. It is interesting to note that
the ineﬃciencies associated with the excess spending on such items is at least partially
oﬀset by the increased eﬃciency in the search process made possible by the conspicuous
consumption.
Our results also highlight the importance of visibility in the marketplace. Given
our signal technology, a consumer of the group that is relatively small is most visible.
Therefore it is the small group that can receive service, as service is tied to a suﬃcient
number of followers. This can obviously be extended to a setting in which consumers
in the same income category have diﬀerent visibility in the market.20 Again those with
higher visibility are more likely to receive service.
As a final point it should be noted that our concept of wealthy vs. poor is one of
relative comparison. Being materially better oﬀ then others is important, as this results
in a "leader" status. The absolute level is not crucial for this. Thus, even in market
settings relative comparisons can be important.21 This provides an understanding of
how some groups can enjoy leadership status even when there is only slight heterogeneity
in society. The actual market outcome in terms of consumption might be quite diﬀerent
even though the underlying heterogeneity is small, because firms may interact with the
19Fang (2001) analyses conspicuous consumption as a way to mediate informational free-riding in a
labor market context; Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995) investigate this in a matching setting.
20Assume e.g. two subgroups of wealthy players, and each consumer sees a member of the first
subgroup for sure but a member of the second only with probability smaller than one.
21Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) and Mailath and Postlewaite (2002) provide a rationale for
relative comparisons in a model where benefits of higher relative standing arise from more attractive
matching opportunities. Samuelson (2004) attributes relative comparisons to evolutionary pressure.
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search process in ways that magnify intrinsic heterogeneity.
4.2. Robustness
We will discuss some of the modelling choices we have made and the robustness of our
results to changes in these assumptions. One of the features of our model that deserves
discussion is the validity of the commitment. We assumed that firms promise some ser-
vice level and always honor their promise when the customer returns. This commitment
assumption is a shorthand way of introducing reputational considerations that allow for
service provision even in Markov-perfect equilibria, i.e., it allows us to rule out equilibria
in which service is not provided because firms cannot convince consumers that they will
get service in the future. In the analysis we have not considered whether firms would
want to renege on their promise (as we assumed that this is not possible). Commitment
is not necessary to support this equilibrium in a world without commitment if we allow
non-Markovian (trigger) strategies: incentive compatibility of the commitments can be
ensured. Equilibria without service as in Proposition 5 can trivially be supported by out
of equilibrium beliefs that no firm will provide service in the future, even if it provided
service in the current period. Providing service in any period thus only induces costs to
the firm without altering future benefits. Equilibria with service such in Propositions 4
and 5 can be supported if consumers believe to never receive service again from a firm
that deviates from equilibrium service provision. If players are suﬃciently long-lived and
patient, the loss of the consumers business or the slowdown of his visits still warrant
service provision. Obviously, uniqueness claims do not apply to such a non-restricted
environment.
In the equilibrium analysis we have established existence for small and large fractions
α of wealthy consumers. Due to our restriction to pure markovian strategies we cannot
ensure existence for intermediate α for arbitrary parameters c, s¯ and F (·). If service
is provided, the signal is better and consumers search more eﬃciently, which reduces
the number of followers. Therefore with service the number of followers might be too
small to warrant service, while without service the number of followers might be large
and service is profitable. In these cases mixed or non-markovian strategies would be
necessary for existence.
We also limit attention to two quality levels. This assumption is not entirely innocu-
ous. If there were three qualities ql < qm < qh with associated population fractions λl,
λm and λh, it is possible that wealthy consumers search only for qh firms, while poor
consumers stop if they found a medium quality firm since their lower frequency of con-
sumption acts similarly to a lower discount factor. Following the wealthy then implies
a high probability of drawing a high quality firm, but also a relatively high probability
of finding a low quality firm since the wealthy do not settle on a medium quality firm
should they find one, and hence may search for a long time. Following the poor reduces
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the risk of finding a low quality firm if they stop searching once they identify either a
medium or high quality firm. This can lead to the wealthy following the wealthy to ob-
tain high quality, and the poor following the poor to find medium or high quality firms.
Nevertheless, modified versions of our results hold if the survival rate δ is suﬃciently
large, since in that case both poor and wealthy will continue searching until they find a
high quality firm.
We also restricted attention to only two levels of service. This simplifies the analysis,
but the model could accommodate multiple levels of service s1, ..., sn at costs c1, ..., cn.
In Proposition 4 the level of service to the poor would be small even if they are followed,
because the number of followers is small. Therefore they would nevertheless search less
frequently, only the wealthy are followed and substantial service is only given to the
wealthy. In Proposition 5 the equilibrium in which the wealthy are followed continues to
exist, because without followers the poor receive little service and the wealthy consume
more often. In this case all consumers receive little service. There will also be an
equilibrium in which everybody follows the poor, as they then have many followers.
Many followers will induce firms to provide top service, and high quality firms outbid low
quality firms. This also happens if service is a continuous choice s ∈ [0, s¯].22 cn > P or
c(s¯) > P would again insure that maximum service is not simply given due to individual
consumption. Yet individual consumption could warrant a service level above zero.
We have assumed a simple signal structure in which each consumer can observe one
wealthy and one poor consumer in every period. All results hold if a consumer can
observe multiple wealthy and multiple poor consumers each period. Since there is a
continuum of firms, the probability of observing two or more consumers who choose the
same firm is zero. Therefore several consumers of the same type are as informative as
a single consumer, and an individual simply decides to follow either one of the wealthy
or one of the poor. On the other hand we could have assumed that each consumer
simply sees the choices of N randomly chosen consumers who purchased last period.
This assumption is closer to models such as those analyzed by Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2003). While analytically much more complicated,
we do not think that it changes the flavor of the results as long as N is suﬃciently large
given the fraction of wealthy people. The reason is that a consumer only cares about
observing at least one poor or at least one wealthy person, depending on whom he wants
to follow. For suﬃciently large N, the probability is virtually one that one poor and
one wealthy consumer is in the observed set.
22 If the service is unbounded, there are parameter constellations for which low quality firms provide
service so high as to prevent the leaders from continued search for high qualities and a pure strategy
equilibrium may not exist. The reason is that low quality firms are willing to give up the full surplus
to retain the customer, while high quality firms are only driven by the encouragement eﬀect of more
frequent consumption due to the markovian restriction.
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Some of the social learning literature assumes some private information by agents.
If we assume that agents receive in each period a private signal that indicates a firm
which is with probability ψ of good and with 1 − ψ of average quality, this would
change the probability of finding a high quality firm when sampling independently to
λ0 = ψ + (1− ψ)λ, rather than simply λ, leaving the results qualitatively unchanged.
We took the price as being exogenously set, and identical across firms regardless of
quality. We argued above that it seems unrealistic that even if prices diﬀered across
firms, they would perfectly convey the quality of firms, and there would remain the
possibility that social learning of the sort in our model would still play a role. It is
nevertheless worth discussing what the equilibria of a model such as we have laid out
would look like if prices were a strategic variable rather than exogenously set. Suppose
that there were a symmetric equilibrium in which all low quality firms set one price and
all high quality firms set a possibly diﬀerent price. If the diﬀerence in quality between
the high and low quality firms is small, there may be a separating equilibrium in which
the prices of the two types of firms are not very diﬀerent, and wealthy people go to
high quality firms while the poor go to cheaper, low quality firms. Suppose, however,
that there was no value to the low quality firm; that is, even if the price were zero,
all consumers would prefer the high quality firm. There clearly cannot be a separating
equilibrium then since low quality firms could profitably charge the same price as high
quality firms. If all firms charge the same price, whether any single firm has an incentive
to deviate depends on consumers’ beliefs when they see an out-of-equilibrium price.
Trivially, beliefs that it is a low quality firm that deviates will support equal pricing.23
Hence, if our model were extended so that pricing was endogenized, one would get the
equal pricing that we assumed.
5. Appendix
It will be convenient to prove lemma 2 prior to lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: We consider first the case where the consumer is promised the
same service s ∈ {0, s¯} from every firm in every period. Having characterized the
consumer search behavior for this case, it is straightforward to extend it to the case
where low-quality firms promise less. We will work with average discounted payoﬀs. The
functional equation for sampling with recall, given that the best quality the consumer
23For low quality firms only new customers are important. These firms want to pool on any price
above marginal cost if they otherwise get no new customers. High quality firms obtain profits from new
customers, but also from existing customers. Analogous to the Diamond Paradox, existing customers
face switching costs and a high quality firm can extract rents from them. In equilibrium high quality
firms must charge a price such that a deviation does not increase the profits from existing customers
beyond the loss of sales due to absence of new customers.
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has yet encountered is q, and given the current shock ρ, can be written as
V C(q, ρ) = max{(1− δ)(q + s+ ρ) + δEρ0V C(q, ρ0), (5.1)
(1− δ)(Eq|γ(q) + ρ) + δEq˜|γEρ0 max{V C(q, ρ0), V C(q˜, ρ0)},
(1− δ)u0 + δEρ0V C(q, ρ0)},
where the first line describes the utility from returning to a known firm with quality
q, the second line describes random sampling and the last line consumption of the
numeraire. Ex denotes the expectation operator with regard to variable x. x = q|γ
refers to variable q when the probability of a high quality is γ.24 We drop the decision-
irrelevant constant u(y−P ). The right hand side of (5.1) defines an operator T : Z → Z.
If [ρ, ρ¯] is bounded, Z = {ν : {ql, qh} × [ρ, ρ¯]→ <|ν is continuous and bounded} and it
is easily checked that T fulfills Blackwell’s (1965) suﬃcient conditions for a contraction.
Therefore, a solution to the problem exists and is unique. For ρ¯ = ∞ note that for all
ρ > ρ¯r = u0−ql+ δ1−δ (qh+s¯−ql) the consumer will consume the indivisible good, because
even if he loses high quality and high service forever (and only gets ql now instead of
u0) the taste shock today outweighs the forgone benefits. Therefore we do not alter his
decision problem if we restrict [ρ, ρ¯] to [ρ, ρ¯r] and assume a distribution Fr(ρ) = F (ρ) for
all ρ < ρ¯r and Fr(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ¯r. Similarly, for ρ < ρr = u0−qh−s¯−
δ
1−δ (qh+s¯−ql)
the consumer would always choose the numeraire to avoid the negative taste shock, even
if he were certain to permanently gain high quality and high service by consuming the
indivisible good, and we can bound the shock distribution from below without altering
the consumer’ decision. On the restricted problem the contraction property establishes
that (5.1) has a unique solution, and so the unrestricted problem has a unique solution.
From (5.1) note that V C(q, ρ) is weakly increasing in q. Therefore for q = qh the
first line in the max-operator is larger than the second. Thus, whenever a consumer
with state variable qh enters the market, he will return to the firm with quality qh rather
than sample a new one. He enters the market if the taste shock is high enough, i.e.,
higher than ρˆh ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) that makes the player indiﬀerent between not consuming (line 3
in equation (5.1)) or going into the market (line 1), so that
(1− δ)(qh + s+ ρˆh) + δEρ0V C(qh, ρ0) = (1− δ)u0 + δEρ0V C(qh, ρ0)
or ρˆh = u0 − qh − s.
Then in any given period the ex ante probability that this player will enter the market
is [1−F (u0− qh− s)], while the ex ante probability of not consuming is F (u0− qh− s).
24We used the shortcut γ for q|γ in the main body of the text.
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Knowing this, the expected average discounted payoﬀ is
Eρ0V C(qh, ρ0) =
Z ρ¯
ρ
max{qh + s+ ρ, u0}dF (ρ) (5.2)
= F (u0 − qh − s)u0 + [1− F (u0 − qh − s)](qh + s) +
Z ρ¯
u0−qh−s
ρdF (ρ)
= u0 +
Z ρ¯
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ.
The second equality is simply the probability of not consuming times the opportunity
cost, plus the probability of going into the market times the value from quality and
service of doing so, plus the expected value of the taste shock when going into the
market. The last line follows by integration by parts.
Now consider q = ql. Assume that searching for a higher quality firm is preferable
to returning to the low quality firm and obtaining service in the next period. (We will
show in the subsequent proof of lemma 1 that this is indeed optimal). The threshold ρˆl
for the taste shock is now given by the equality of line 2 and 3 in (5.1), so that
(1−δ)(Eq|γ(q)+ρˆl)+δ(1−γ)Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0)+δγEρ0V C(qh, ρ0) = (1−δ)u0+δEρ0V C(ql, ρ0),
or
δγ
1− δ
£
Eρ0V C(qh, ρ0)−Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0)
¤
= u0 −Eq|γ(q˜)− ρˆl. (5.3)
Taking ρˆl as given, we can express the expected value as
Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0) = F (ρˆl)[(1− δ)u0 + δEρ0V C(ql, ρ0)]
+[1− F (ρˆl)](1− δ)
£
Eq|γ(q) +Eρ0(ρ0|ρ0 ≥ ρˆl)
¤
+[1− F (ρˆl)]δ
£
γEρ0V C(qh, ρ0) + (1− γ)Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0)
¤
.
The first line weights the opportunity cost of consumption by the probability F (ρˆl) of
not consuming. The term [1−F (ρˆl)] in the second and third line reflects the probability
of entering the market. The utility from doing so is comprised of two components. Line
2 reflects the instantaneous expected value from entering the market due to quality and
taste shock, while line 3 represents the expected continuation value after encountering
a firm with high or low quality respectively. After rearranging terms we have
Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0) = F (ρˆl)u0 + [1− F (ρˆl)]Eq|γ(q) +
Z ρ¯
ρˆl
ρdF (ρ)
+[1− F (ρˆl)]
δγ
1− δ
£
Eρ0V C(qh, ρ0)−Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0)
¤
.
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Inserting (5.3) and rearranging gives
Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0) = u0 − [1− F (ρˆl)]ρˆl +
Z ρ¯
ρˆl
ρdF (ρ) = u0 +
Z ρ¯
ρˆl
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (5.4)
Substituting (5.4) and (5.2) into (5.3), we obtain an implicit function characterizing the
threshold shock value ρˆl ∈ (u0 − qh − s, u0 −Eq|γ(q)) :
ρˆl − u0 +Eq|γ(q) +
δγ
1− δ
Z ρˆl
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ = 0. (5.5)
By the intermediate value theorem there is a solution to this equation, and the solution
is unique as the left hand side is strictly increasing in ρˆl.
Finally, note that when both firms oﬀer service s = s¯, the customer will not return
to a low quality firm (see lemma 1). Since service is not provided in the first period,
the customer will never experience service from any low quality firm, even if it promises
to provide service should the customer return. Therefore the results also hold for the
case where only high quality firms promise service s¯, while low quality firms may not.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a consumer of type θ with opportunity cost uθ0 who
has experienced only low quality firms. If low quality firms do not oﬀer service, the
consumer would search for a high quality firm, as nothing is lost by doing so.
If both types of firms oﬀer service, the cost of searching consists of the forgone
service (recall that first period service at a new firm is zero). Assume searching for
a high quality firm is not optimal, given that the best firm encountered so far is low
quality and all firms oﬀer service. In other words a consumer always returns to the first
firm he encounters. Similar to a derivation as in equation (5.2), the expected value at
q = ql is then Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0) = uθ0 +
R ρ¯
uθ0−ql−s¯
[1 − F (ρ)]dρ. The condition under which
returning to the low quality firm rather than searching is optimal is then
(1− δ)(ql + s¯+ ρ) + δEρ0V C(ql, ρ0)
≥ (1− δ)(Eq|γ(q) + ρ) + δEq˜|γEρ0 max{V C(ql, ρ0), V C(q˜, ρ0)},
or
(1− δ)
¡
ql −Eq|γ(q) + s¯
¢
≥ δγ
£
Eρ0V C(qh, ρ0)−Eρ0V C(ql, ρ0)
¤
.
Substitution and division by γ yields
(1− δ)
µ
ql − qh +
s¯
γ
¶
≥ δ
Z uθ0−ql−s¯
uθ0−qh−s¯
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (5.6)
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Since
R uθ0−qh−s¯
uθ0−ql−s¯
[1−F (ρ)]dρ > 0 and independent of δ, and γ > 0, there exists δθ such that
for δ > δθ condition (5.6) cannot hold, where δθ is defined as the survival probability
that solves (5.6) with equality. For s¯ < γ(qh − ql), δθ ≤ 0. If δ > δ ≡ max{0, δw, δp},
all consumers will search for high quality firms. This establishes lemma 1. Note that
for γ ≥ λ a bound δ can be established independently of the exact value of γ by finding
the fixed point of the equality in (5.6) when γ is replaced by λ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 : Consider the mapping τ : [λ, 1] × [uw0 − qh − s¯, up0 − ql] →
[λ, 1] × [uw0 − qh − s¯, up0 − ql] such that τ(γ, ρˆ) =
µ
τ1(γ, ρˆl)
τ2(γ, ρˆl)
¶
. Similar to equation
(3.10) let τ1(γ, ρˆl) be defined as
τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) = 1−
£
1− δ + δBθ
¤
[1− λ]
1− δ + δ(1− λ+ γ)Bθ +
h
δλ+ δ
2
1−δB
θγ
i
Cθ
, (5.7)
with Bθ ≡ 1−F (ρˆθl ) and Cθ ≡ 1−F (uθ0−qh−s). When the wealthy follow other wealthy
consumers, θ = w. However, the analysis holds similarly for the poor following other
poor, i.e., θ = p. For γ ∈ [λ, 1] the multiplier of (1 − λ) is strictly smaller than 1 and
so τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) > λ. Clearly τ1(γ, ρˆ
θ
l ) < 1. Similar to equation (3.1), let τ2(γ, ρˆ
θ
l ) = τ2(γ)
be implicitly defined by
τ2(γ) = uθ0 −Eq|γ(q)−
δγ
1− δ
Z τ2(γ)
uθ0−qh−sh(θ)
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (5.8)
The function τ is continuous. For τ1 this is easy to see. For τ2, note that in (5.8)
γ as a function of τ2 is continuous and strictly monotone. Therefore τ2(γ) is also
continuous. Domain and codomain of τ are identical, and they are compact subsets of
<2. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point of τ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider θ ∈ {p,w}. For γ ∈ (λ, 1) we have γθ > λ (see
discussion in proof of lemma 4, where τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) corresponds to γ
θ). To compare γw and
γp consider the general form of (3.10) with w replaced by θ, where θ ∈ {p,w}. Some
algebra reveals that (∂γθ/∂Bθ) > 0 iﬀ (γ − λ)δ(1− δ) + δ2(γ − λ)Cθ > 0, which holds
since γ ∈ (λ, 1). Clearly (∂γθ/∂Cθ) > 0. Therefore γw > γp if Cp < Cw and Bp < Bw,
which is by lemma (3) the case for sh(w) ≥ sh(p) or s¯ < up0 − uw0 . By the same lemma
sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > ξγ implies Cp > Cw and Bp > Bw, which in turn implies γw < γp.
In the intermediate case of sh(p) − sh(w) = s¯ ∈ (up0 − uw0 , ξγ) we have Cp > Cw but
Bp < Bw. If sh(p) − sh(w) ≈ up0 − uw0 , then Cp ≈ Cw but Bp < Bw and therefore
γw > γp. If sh(p)− sh(w) ≈ ξγ, then Cp > Cw but Bp ≈ Bw and therefore γw < γp. If
sh(p)−sh(w) = s¯ ∈ (up0−uw0 , ξγ) an increase in s¯ increases Cp and Bp but leaves Cw and
Bw unchanged, and there exists unique ξˆγ ∈ (u
p
0− uw0 , ξγ) for which sh(p)− sh(w) = ξˆγ
implies γw < γp. Q.E.D.
June 6, 2006 31
Proof of Proposition 2: To illustrate how Π is calculated, consider the following
candidate stationary equilibrium: All consumers follow the wealthy, the wealthy are
promised service by high quality and not by low quality firms, and no firm promises
service to the poor. In this case, the benefit of a wealthy consumer to a high quality
firm, denoted Πwh, comprises the wealthy consumer’s own contribution P − c, plus the
life-time contributions of his followers. The expected number Nw of wealthy followers in
the next period is given by the number of consumers who are searching in that period
divided by the number of all wealthy who are consuming, i.e., Nw =
ϕwl
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
= 1 − γ.
In subsequent periods they consume with probability 1 − F (uw0 − qh − s¯) conditional
on surviving. They generate benefit Πwh every time they visit. These followers do not
get service on their first visit to the firm, and finally, there are Np =
ϕpl
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
1−α
α poor
consumers who follow in the next period. In every subsequent period they consume
with probability 1−F (up0− qh) if they survive. They generate benefit P each time they
consume. Thus, the contribution of a wealthy consumer is given by
Πwh = P − c +βNwΠwh
∙
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
w
0 − qh − s))
¸
+ βNwc (5.9)
+βNpP
∙
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
p
0 − qh))
¸
.
The proof of the proposition is divided into three lemmata. The following lemma
establishes that a leader’s benefit to a firm can be arbitrarily high if he is followed by
suﬃciently many customers of the other type.
Lemma 5 Fix M > 0. Assume type θ customers are being followed by consumers of
the other type θ¯ 6= θ. Assume the type θ¯ consumers do not receive service. Then for
any δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists α¯ > 0, such that for all αθ ∈ (0, α¯) the benefit Π of a type θ
customer to a firm is greater than M (independent of the service strategies toward type
θ consumers).
Proof: Since the type θ¯ followers do not receive service by assumption, they will
search for high quality firms. The value of next-period type θ¯ followers to any firm due
to a visit by a leader is at least
(1− δ)αθ¯[1− F (uθ¯0 − ql)]2(1− λ)δ
1
αθ
Pβ, (5.10)
where αw = α and αp = 1−α. In every period there will be (1−δ)αθ¯ newborn followers
of type θ¯ who go into the market with probability greater than [1− F (uθ¯0 − q)] > 0, do
not find a suﬃciently good firm with probability (1 − λ), survive another period with
probability δ, and consume again with probability of at least [1−F (uθ¯0− ql)]. This time
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they follow a leader who was in the market the previous period, of whom there are at
most αθ. They pay price P, and since they follow a period later than the visit of the
leader, their value is discounted by β. The expression goes to infinity as αθ going to
zero.
The firm might incur service costs for the leader, but these are easily oﬀset by his
immediate type θ¯ followers. The leader might also have followers of his own type, which
themselves bring a benefit larger than M in the period after and will therefore increase
this consumers benefit even more. Q.E.D.
Recall that a high quality firm can induce a customer to return by promising service.
The following lemma shows that a high quality firm will provide service when the cus-
tomer’s profit contribution is suﬃciently large. Let Πθh denote the benefit of one-time
consumption of a type θ consumer for a high quality firm.
Lemma 6 There exists M > 0 such that in any stationary equilibrium with Πθh > M ,
a high quality firm will promise service s¯ in any period to type θ consumers.
Proof: Let s be the equilibrium strategy of a high quality firm to a type θ customer
that generates the benefit of Πθh for the firm. Let sˇ 6= s be a one-shot deviation in the
service promise.
If promising sˇ instead of s = s¯ results in the customer searching for another firm and
never returning, then for Πθh > M = c oﬀering the service is optimal, since by oﬀering
service the firm retains the business of this consumer and gains Πθh−c when he returns.
As discussed above, our restrictive equilibrium concept necessitates the discussion of the
case where the consumer would return even if service were not promised for one period.25
For this case the proof is divided into two parts. The first establishes that increasing
(decreasing) the service promise increases (decreases) the probability with which the
consumer returns by a finite amount. The second provides the lower bound for the
profitability of the consumer such that the threat of a potential time delay warrants
service promises.
For the first part we discuss the consumer’s reaction to a deviation. In equilibrium
the customer returns whenever ρ ≥ ρˆθh = uθ0 − qh − s, otherwise he does not consume.
Assume that the customer also chooses the firm rather than random sampling at sˇ ∈
{0, s¯}\{s}. Let V C (qh, ρ) = V C(ρ) and V F be the flow payoﬀ of this strategy for the
customer and the firm respectively. Consider the customer’s response to a one-shot
deviation by the firm. The value function Vˇ C(ρ) of the customer for the period directly
25Since the equilibrium strategy of a firm is a function s(θ) independent of the history, after a one-
shot deviation a consumer still expects to get the equilibrium service promise whenever he returns. This
belief makes it hard to sustain an equilibrium at s = s¯ and easy to sustain an equilibrium at s = 0,
because the consumer expects the change for only a single period and reacts little (compared e.g. to
the case where he expects the change to continue forever).
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after the deviation is
Vˇ C(ρ) = max{(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρ) + δEV C(ρ), (1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ)}. (5.11)
Let ρˇ be the value for which the first term in the max operator is equal to the second
term, i.e.,
(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρˇ) + δEV C(ρ) = (1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ). (5.12)
This implies that the customer will return to the firm when ρ ≥ ρˇ, and will not consume
otherwise. Then
EVˇ C(ρ) =
Z ρ¯
ρˇ
£
(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρ) + δEV C(ρ)
¤
f(ρ)dρ+
Z ρˇ
ρ
h
(1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ)
i
f(ρ)dρ.
Therefore
(1− δF (ρˇ))EVˇ C(ρ) = (1− F (ρˇ))
£
(1− δ)(qh + sˇ) + δEV C(ρ)
¤
(5.13)
+
Z ρ¯
ρˇ
(1− δ)ρf(ρ)dρ+ F (ρˇ)(1− δ)uθ0.
Substituting (5.13) into the equation (5.12), integration by parts and rearranging yields:
(1− δ)(ρˇ+ qh + sˇ)− δ
Z ρ¯
ρˇ
(1− F (ρ))dρ− uθ0 + δEV C(ρ) = 0.
The value of EV C(ρ) is given by lemma (2). Substitution leads to
(1− δ)(ρˇ+ qh + sˇ− uθ0) + δ
Z ρˇ
uθ0−qh−s
(1− F (ρ))dρ = 0. (5.14)
Equation (5.14) has a unique solution. It also reveals that for s = 0 and sˇ = s¯ we
have ρˇ < uθ0 − qh, which implies that the frequency of consumption is increased by the
deviation. Let ζs be the probability of returning each period under the equilibrium
strategy s, and let ζˇs be the probability of returning next period after a one-shot de-
viation in the service promise. Then ζˇ0 − ζ0 = (1 − F (ρˇ)) − (1 − F (uθ0 − qh)) > 0.
On the other hand for s = s¯ and sˇ = 0 equation (5.14) reveals that ρˇ < uθ0 − qh − s¯,
which implies that the deviation decreases the frequency of consumption. That is,
ζˇ s¯−ζ s¯ ≡ (1−F (ρˇ))−(1−F (uθ0−qh−s¯)) < 0. Hence, a change in service provision changes
the frequency of consumption by a finite amount, i.e. 4ζ ≡ min{ζˇ0− ζ0, |ζˇ s¯− ζ s¯|} > 0.
For the second part we discuss the firm’s incentive to deviate. We show that for Π
large enough s = 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy since a one-shot deviation would
be profitable. We also show that s = s¯ is an equilibrium strategy.
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Consider first the case where the candidate equilibrium strategy is s = 0, the one-
shot deviation is sˇ = s¯. In this case (ζˇ0−ζ0) > 0. Note that the eﬀective discount factor
for the firm in this case is δF = δβ because the firm discounts with β and the survival
probability of the customer is δ. Normalizing profits by (1− δF ), the equilibrium value
to the firm is V F = ζ0Πθh. The value to the firm from period t + 1 onward after a
one-shot deviation in period t is
Vˇ F = ζˇ0((1− δF )(Πθh − c) + δFV F ) + (1− ζˇ0)δF Vˇ F .
A one-shot deviation is profitable if Vˇ F > V F , or equivalently Πθh > ζˇ0
ζˇ0−ζ0
c. This is
fulfilled if M ≥ 14ζ c.
Consider now the case of s = s¯ and sˇ = 0. In this case (ζˇ s¯−ζ s¯) < 0. The equilibrium
(flow) value to the firm is V F = ζ s¯Πθh. The flow value to the firm from period t + 1
onward after a one-shot deviation in period t is
Vˇ F = ζˇ s¯((1− δF )(Πθh + c) + δFV F ) + (1− ζˇ s¯)δF Vˇ F .
A one-shot deviation is not profitable if Vˇ F ≤ V F , or equivalently Πθh ≥ ζˇs¯
ζs¯−ζˇs¯
c. This
is fulfilled if M ≥ 14ζ c. Therefore for Πθh > M ≥
1
4ζ c the only equilibrium strategies
for high quality firms is s = s¯. Q.E.D.
Finally we show that high quality firms will always outbid low quality firms:
Lemma 7 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1). In any stationary equilibrium, either sh(θ) ≥ sl(θ) for θ ∈
{p,w}, or sh(θ) < sl(θ) but type θ consumers nevertheless do not return to low quality
firms.
Proof: Assume sh(θ) < sl(θ) and type θ customers stop searching when they have
found a low quality firm. There are two possibilities: Either they stop searching at the
first firm they encounter, in which case γθ = λ. Or they do not return to high quality
firms but keep searching for a low quality firm. In this case γθ < λ.
Call type θ consumers group Y, and type θ¯ consumers group Z. Group Y consumers
must have some consumers that follow them or service would not be profitable. It cannot
be that every consumer who is searching follows group Y, because group Z would then
not receive service as it has no followers, and would therefore look for high quality firms.
If γθ = λ, by Proposition 1 γ θ¯ > λ and group Z consumers should follow members of
their own group. If γθ < λ, group Z consumers are better oﬀ sampling on their own.
Therefore either group Y members are only followed by group Y members, or they are
only followed by group Z members.
In the second case, both groups would have to continue searching for low qualities
(plus service) after finding a high quality firm. Assume group Y did not; then they
June 6, 2006 35
would stay at the first firm they patronize. But then group Z has no followers, thus
receives no service and will look for high quality firms. But then it is not optimal for
group Z to follow group Y. Assume group Z did not leave high quality firms; then they
either stay at the first firm they encounter and do not follow group Y, or they only
look for high quality firms, in which case following group Y is suboptimal. Therefore
it must be that group Z searches for low quality firms, which implies that group Z also
receives service from low quality firms. To receive service, it must be that they are
followed by group Y. So both groups receive service form low quality firms and not from
high quality firms. In this case, if the poor are leaving high quality firms to search for
low quality plus service, then the wealthy strictly prefer to leave high quality firms to
receive low quality plus service (as their higher frequency of consumption is similar to
a lower discount factor). Yet by an argument similar to proposition 1, the signal of the
wealthy is more informative about finding low quality firms when both types search for
them and get identical service. Therefore the wealthy would not follow the poor, and
this case cannot constitute an equilibrium.
We are therefore left with the case in which each group Y member is, in equilibrium,
followed by some expected number Nθ of other members of its own group (and none of
the other group). The candidate equilibrium profit contribution Πθl that a low quality
firm receives from a group Y customer returning one more time is
Πθl = P − c+ βNθΠθl
∙
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
θ
0 − ql − s¯))
¸
+ βNθc. (5.15)
The derivation is similar to that of equation (5.9). In the stationary setting
βNθ
∙
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
θ
0 − ql − s¯))
¸
< 1.
Solving for Πθl yields:
Πθl =
P − c+ βNθc
1− βNθ[1 + δβ1−δβ [1− F (uθ0 − ql − s¯)]]
. (5.16)
For this to be an equilibrium, Πθl ≥ 0. Consider first the case where Πθl > 0, i.e.
P − c + βNθc > 0. In this case high quality firms have an incentive to deviate and
also oﬀer service to group Y consumers, which upsets the equilibrium. To see this,
note that for a high quality firm the candidate equilibrium profit contribution from a
group Y consumer is zero after the first period of consumption, because he does not
consume there again. Deviating and oﬀering service to the customer and all his followers
generates the profit contribution
Π0 = P − c+ βNθΠ0
∙
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F
0)
¸
+ βNθc,
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where 1−F 0 is the probability with which a customer that is oﬀered service is returning.
Since ρ¯ > uθ0− qh− s¯, the frequency 1−F 0 > 0. Since P − c+ δNθc > 0, it follows that
Π0 > 0.26 But then high quality firms would oﬀer service.
Consider now the case Πθl = 0, i.e. P − c+ βNθc = 0. Therefore, low quality firms
are indiﬀerent between promising service or not. In this case high quality firms are also
indiﬀerent between oﬀering service or not. By the tie-breaking rule we employed, both
types of firms oﬀer service.27 However, consumers then do not search for low quality
firms; consequently high quality firms oﬀer service, and group Y customers would not
search for low qualities. Q.E.D.
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